NODULE X22

CIA STATION MEXICO CITY
KEEPS THE HEAT OFF

DAVID ATLEE PHILIPS
For the most up-to-date version of this Nodule go to

THE TAPES OF OSWALD’S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WERE DESTROYED AFTER THE ASSASSINATION

A Letter Head Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 23, 1963, "set forth the fact that Agents reviewed the tape [of OSWALD speaking with the Soviets], and concluded the voice was not that of OSWALD." That was because the CIA gave them a tape of someone other than OSWALD to listen to. Gaeton Fonzi developed evidence that William Coleman and David Slawson both heard scratchy versions of the tape. [Last Investigation p286] In a letter dated December 4, 1992 (published in The Investigator), W. David Slawson wrote: “Yes, I listened to the tape of Lee Harvey Oswald’s telephone conversations with the Soviet Embassy In Mexico City I did not feel that the voice sounded any different from what I expected his would sound like.” If you believe Slawson you believe that OSWALD was the lone gunman. Why didn’t the Warren Commission get a dub of the actual tape so the Commissioners could hear these conversations? Because there was more on the tapes than there was in the transcripts and they had been deliberately or routinely erased shortly after they were made. There was a conversation on the tapes about OSWALD getting money and a visa in return for vital information.

In November 1976 DAVID PHILLIPS told the HSCA that the CIA monitored and taped OSWALD’S telephone conversations with the Soviet Embassy. According to PHILLIPS the tape was transcribed by Boris and Anna Tarasoff and then routinely destroyed. [The Washingtonian 11.80] During SENSTUDY, (a review of FBI files on behalf of the SSCIA) it was determined that the CIA on November 23, 1963, "provided the FBI’s
Legal Attaché in Mexico City with a transcript of said tape recording and advised the Legal Attaché that the original tape had been erased..." As of 2010, only the transcripts remain. PHILLIPS was asked about the tapes during the course of HUNT v. WEBERMAN "Of course, I do know about it. Obviously I cannot, and will not, answer that question." The CIA released a document that stated

...the tape of the first conversation (September 28, 1963) had been erased before the second call (October 1, 1963) had been received...On November 26, 1963, the Mexico Desk of the Western Hemisphere Division disseminated a transcript of the telephone call of September 28, 1963, and a transcript of the telephone call made on October 1, 1963, in which the caller identified himself as LEE OSWALD. The Mexico Desk included a transcript of three other telephone calls made on September 27, 1963, October 1, 1963, and October 3, 1963. The Mexico Desk commented that 'Voice comparisons indicated that the 'North American' who participated in several of these conversations is probably the person who identified himself as LEE OSWALD on October 1, 1963.' (CSCI-3/778,829) This latter statement is not entirely accurate. According to a previous cable from Mexico City - MEXI 7023, November 23, 1963, - the tapes of the September 28, 1963, telephone call had been erased. If that were so, the tape of the September 27, 1963, call must have been erased. Analysis by voice comparison could not be made; however the monitor based his analysis upon what he could recall of the conversations as they were recorded on tape.

All the tapes had to be eventually erased after two weeks but some tapes, in which OSWALD said off-the-wall things that would have triggered an all out investigation of
OSWALD were erased immediately. If the FBI opened up a counter-espionage case on Comrade OSWALD his value as a patsy in the upcoming “big event” would be nil.

GOODPASTURE

Who could have erased the tape or tapes prematurely? Once this happened it was easy enough to alter the content of the transcripts. Who worked closely with ANGLETON and PHILLIPS? Anne Goodpasture. Goodpasture the daughter of two schoolteachers, was born in Tennessee. During the Second World War she joined the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and served in Burma. After the war Goodpasture was recruited by the CIA. Eventually she went to work for JAMES ANGLETON. According to ANGLETON, Goodpasture was "very close" to William K. Harvey. Goodpasture was involved in the investigation and arrest of Rudolph Ivanovich Abel. In 1957 ANGLETON sent Goodpasture to investigate a Soviet Spy in Mexico City. Winston Scott, who was the CIA's station chief in Mexico, was so impressed with Goodpasture that he arranged for her to become his reports officer. In December 1958, Scott initiated operation LITEMPO, a network of paid agents and collaborators in the Mexican Government. This included Luis Echeverria. After Fidel Castro took power in Cuba Scott was asked by Allen W. Dulles to use his LITEMPO to help overthrow the government. Adolfo Lopez Mateos, who was now president of Mexico resisted this idea. He told Dulles covert action was a different matter. What was in those tapes that had to be erased?

THE RONALD KESSLER REPORT

Evidence existed that the transcripts did not reflect the true nature of OSWALD'S contacts with the Soviets. The translator and typist's wife, Mrs. Anna Tarasoff, remembered the word "information" being used. Journalist Ron Kessler was told by DAVID PHILLIPS that during one of OSWALD'S conversations with the Soviets he stated: "I have information you would be interested in, and I know you can pay my way to Russia." The stenographer who typed up the transcript and the translator who prepared it had similar recollections: "OSWALD said he had some information to tell the Russians. His main concern was getting to one of the two countries (Russia or Cuba), and he wanted them to pay him for it. He said he had to meet them." [Washington Post 11.26.76]

The HSCA verified this: "The HSCA has contacted the persons who allegedly translated and typed the manuscripts. Both of them said that in his conversations with the foreign embassies OSWALD did talk of a 'deal' to go to Russia." [CIA George T. Kalaris IG Memo 77-0244] The CIA did a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of Ron Kessler's article which was highly deleted. [Allen v. DOD CIA 21689-0843]

The HSCA questioned Boris Tarasoff, a Staff CIA Officer who started working in Mexico City in June 1963, and continued there until October 1970. Boris Tarasoff received the
tapes the day after they were made, and he remembered translating OSWALD'S broken Russian.

Q. Would you tell us what your duties were?

A. My duties were on a more or less permanent basis to receive the tapes first, then to translate from Russian into English the conversation that was on the tape, and to transcribe the whole thing. The tapes originated right there in Mexico City, because some of the telephone wires leading to areas, establishments, tapped. Therefore, as a result, we had these conversations on the tape...There were several operations going on as a result of which we got tapes also, but they were taken of the so-called bugs, were planted in several strategic spots, dealing with Soviet nationals. Therefore I had to transcribe them too.

Q. Would you receive the tapes the day after they were made?

A. Yes.

Q. And you would deliver them the following day, after you transcribed them and translated them?

A. Yes.

Q. In conjunction with your transcribing and translation operation, did you ever have occasion to make personality assessment, or voice identification, of the people whose voices you heard on the tapes?

A. That was my idea that I suggested to them after I came for my regular tour of duty, to have the voice sample. The idea was rejected. On what grounds I do not know. Anyway, after about three or four months, they did come out with a suggestion that I start saving these voice samples. We got quite a collection of voice samples.

Q. In conjunction with the personality assessment which you sometimes made based on what you heard from tapes, did you have occasion to make comments on the transcription sheet when you detected something about the person’s personality from the tapes?

A. First, I used to make just a short synopsis saying, well, "This fellow is saying in an agitated voice" and so forth. I would inject some of my personal feeling about a person. I put these on a separate piece of paper.

Q. Mr. Tarasoff, in the course of your duties, did LEE HARVEY OSWALD come to your attention as a result of your duties in the surveillance operation?
A. At the end of September I think it was, 1963. First of all he called -- as far as I recall, he tried to speak Russian, but I think his Russian was so poor that I did not understand. I cannot recall without seeing the transcript. He called the Soviet Embassy as far as I can remember. As far as I remember there were two conversations. There might have been more. I am not certain. I cannot recall the tone of his voice or what he said. [After he gave the CIA Station the OSWALD transcriptions] I got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of this person because sometimes we had so-called 'defectors' from the United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I - the station. Consequently, they were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If you can get a name rush it over immediately." Therefore it is very seldom that I underlined the name because I put them in capitals. In this case I did it because it was so important to them.

Q. Can you tell us exactly what lead to his request?

A. I have no idea what lead to it. That was my only main point, to find the name, to get the name of this person and deliver it as soon as possible to the station.

Q. Can you speculate as to why this request was made?

A. If would be simply a speculation. If he called the Cuban Embassy and our people knew about it, then they really would be pressed to get the name.

Q. Are you saying that there is a possibility that OSWALD spoke to the Cuban Embassy personnel, in addition to the Soviet Embassy personnel, and that the people you dealt with in your operation made that connection, and consequently made an urgent request that this person be identified?

A. There is a possibility, I think, that that is exactly what happened.

Q. Do you remember of OSWALD spoke English or Russian during that conversation?

A. As far as I remember he was speaking English. Whenever he did slip a couple of words of Russian in, it must have been unintelligible.

Q. There is a comment between the slash marks on this page which states "The same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian." Based on this possible discrepancy, do you have any feeling as to whether this document is authentic, as opposed to being a forgery, or an amended version of the original document?
A. I cannot conceive of this document being a forgery. I have an idea in the back of my head that it was much stronger. There is the whole thing, the spacing, I cannot say that it was longer than it is now.

Q. Do you have any independent recollection of OSWALD having mentioned his financial situation during this conversation?

A. No, I do not have any recollection of that.

Q. Were you able to identify the speaker in the September 28, 1963, conversation?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever make the inference that the speakers on September 28, 1963, and October 1, 1963, were one and the same person?

A. I sure did, right here, under item 151, under P1.

Mrs. Anna Tarasoff remembered:

Q. Aside from what appears on these three documents, do you have any independent recollection of conversations dealing with LEE HARVEY OSWALD which were part of the surveillance operation in Mexico City?

A. According to my recollection, I, myself, have made a transcript, an English transcript, of LEE OSWALD talking to Russian Consulate or whoever he was at that time, asking for financial aid. Now that particular transcript does not appear here, and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it was a lengthy transcript between him and someone at the Russian Embassy.

Q. How long do you recall this conversation was?

A. This conversation, I would say, at least covered a page and a half or two.

Q. Is it your recollection that the person speaking identified himself as LEE OSWALD?

A. He definitely identified himself as being LEE OSWALD.

Q. Earlier you spoke of an urgent request for a transcription of a conversation. Could you tell us the circumstances surrounding this urgent request?
A. This urgent request either came from the party that was doing the monitoring of the transcripts, and it came through and when these reels are delivered to us, if there is any request, it is also included with a - well, on a regular copy of the whole transcript, it would be included with the reels, "In number so and so there is a conversation. Will you please handle this prior to anything other than what is on the sheet originally?"

Q. Do you recall the names of the contact who made the urgent request?

A. This was written on a piece of paper, and was enclosed in with the reels. So, I would hardly know who that particular party was who requested this.

Q. What did you do after you received this request?

A. We went ahead and transcribed whatever was on that particular reel in the space allotted or space designated. After it was transcribed, we contacted whoever it was then. They, in turn, came by and picked it up. Once it left our hands we have no knowledge of what happened to it. It was our normal contact at the time.

Q. Do you remember any other details of the conversation which you say involved LEE HARVEY OSWALD?

A. Well, for one thing, he was persistent in asking for financial aid in order to leave the country. They were not about to give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also mentioned he tried the Cuban Embassy, and they had also refused financial aid.

Q. I believe you stated earlier that the person speaking identified himself as LEE OSWALD in the conversation?

A. Yes, he definitely did identify himself as LEE OSWALD.

Q. On the basis of this identification were you able to infer that the person who spoke on September 28, 1963, was also LEE OSWALD.

A. Not listening this particular tape or the other one, I would not know whether it was the same party or not.

Q. Do you recall any other subject that was covered in that conversation that you transcribed other than the requests for financial aid?

A. That was his main purpose sir, just getting financial aid, because he had said he was broke and he wanted to leave the country, and he was seeking financial aid, and he thought he was contacting the Russian
Embassy or Cuban Embassy, I think, would be willing to finance his passage to wherever he wanted to go. There was nothing - the conversation was a repetition of questions and answers really, and the party who spoke to him spoke in English, so there was no difficulty in understanding either one of them as to what they were saying to each other.

Q. As you recall it, the net effect was they turned him down?

A. Yes, they definitely turned him down. In fact, if I recall, they finally got disgusted and hung up on him. [CIA 429-149; HSCA Test. 4.12.78]

The Tarasoffs created summaries of their transcriptions. The CIA:

About mid-1962 (check date) LIENVOY telephone numbers of the Soviet, Cuban and Satellite Embassies. (Deleted) LIFEAT (deleted) was (deleted) connected 5 Cuban lines, 5 Soviet lines, 3 Czech, 2 Polish and 1 Yugoslav line. The base house listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume for the Chief of Station which was received each day around 8:00 a.m. passed by (deleted) to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9:00 a.m. Later, when a reel was completely recorded, full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station; however, there was usually a time lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian, or a language other than Spanish or English, were taken to another location for translation and typing. In the case of the Russian translations Boris Tarasoff usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation because of the volume of Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation. During this period (Fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section, or they may have been carried to him by (deleted), but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to (deleted) to take to Boris. (Deleted) handled all of the processing of Soviet transcripts.

Boris Tasaroff died November 15, 1995 and Anna died January 1, 2001. HEMMING told this researcher:

He was gonna tip the Cubans and Soviets off about Banister and all the CIA punks in New Orleans who were plotting and scheming something serious. That was the 'information.'
PHILLIPS was still in Mexico City when Oswald arrived and was intent on facilitating OSWALD’s trip to Cuba by coaching him, using CIA assets and keeping surveillance off OSWALD. ANGLETON would do the same out of Langley. On **OCTOBER 8, 1963**, a cable went out from the CIA's Mexico City Station to the component of the CIA that logged American's contacts with the Soviets:

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**Origin:** LADILLINGER [Barbara Murphy Manell]
**Distribution:** Communications; Chronology; Soviet Contacts 50-8-10-6
**ROUTINE**
To: Director Info. Cite Mexi 6453
LC IMPROVE [Counter-espionage involving Soviet intelligence services worldwide]

1. According LIENVOY [the bugging operation in Mexico City] on October 1, 1963, American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name was LEE OSWALD (phonetic), stated he was at Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul who he believed to be Valeriy Vladimipovich Kostikov. Subject asked Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there anything new regarding telegram to Washington. Obyedkov, upon checking, said nothing received yet, but request had been sent.

2. Have photos male appears be American entering Soviet Embassy 12:16 p.m., leaving 12:22 p.m. on October 1, 1963, apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, blading [sic] top. Wore khakis and sport shirt. Source LIEMPTY

3. No local dissem.

Authenticating Officer  Releasing Officer
LADILLINGER [Barbara Manell]  Willard C. Curtis [WINSTON SCOTT]


There was no conspiracy on the part of the Manells to deliberately include a wrong description of OSWALD. She looked at the surveillance photos and found a shot of a man leaving and entering the Embassy in the corresponding temporal parameters of the
telephone call and figured this must be the man who initiated the call. Manell had no idea that PHILLIPS had made sure OSWALD would not be photographed as he entered the Soviet Embassy. The photo above shows the man thought to be connected to the telephone call outside the Sov Emb. He has been the fictional character in a lot of disinformation about the coup and has never been identified. That was the last time OSWALD appeared on the CIA's radar until October 1, 1963 however the information was withheld until October 9, 1963 when OSWALD was back in Dallas-Fort Worth. On **OCTOBER 9, 1963** the Director of the CIA was sent this cable:

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**October 9, 1963.**
To: Director.
From: Mexico City.
Action: Western Hemisphere 8
Info:
CI [Counter-Intelligence-ANGLETON’S General Staff]
CI/OPS [Counter-Intelligence / Operations]
1. According LIENVOY on October 1, 1963, American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name was LEE OSWALD (phonetic), stated he was at Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul who he believed to be Valeriy Vladimipovich Kostikov. Subject asked Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there anything new regarding telegram to Washington. Obyedkov, upon checking, said nothing received yet, but request had been sent.

2. Have photos male, appears be American entering Soviet Embassy 12:16 p.m., leaving 12:22 p.m. on October 1, 1963, apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, blading [sic] top. Wore khakis and sport shirt. Source LIEMPTY

3. No local dissemination.

Willard C. Curtis [Winston Scott] releasing officer

THE CIA’S DELAY IN SENDING THE OSWALD OUTCABLE

A document dated January 31, 1964 that the CIA gave to the Warren Commission, stated that news of the OSWALD/Ivan Obyedkov telephone conversation was cabled to CIA Headquarters "the same day it was received. A file check in Washington which is routine in these matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the LEE OSWALD who had spoken with Ivan Obyedkov, and presumably with Kostikov, and the defector returnee, LEE HARVEY OSWALD." The cable from the Mexico City CIA Station, to Headquarters, went out nine days later (October 9, 1963), and not on the day after the transcripts had been reviewed. In Nightwatch, PHILLIPS wrote: "Mr. Manell the Case Officer in charge of Soviet Operations, was the first to become aware of OSWALD on the basis of the latter's contact with the Soviet Embassy...Herbert procrastinated...his wife typed out the cable." [PHILLIPS Nightwatch p80 et. al.] In 1977 the CIA generated a document titled, "Delay in Sending the First Cable about OSWALD," which stated:

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name LEE OSWALD. It was discussed in DAVE PHILLIPS' book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which, in my view, was unjust and unnecessary
and indicates that DAVE PHILLIPS did not know what he was talking about).

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the October 1, 1963, conversation would have been picked up upon the morning of October 2, 1963. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on October 3, 1963. The translation would have been returned the following day (October 4, 1963), at which time the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before October 7, 1963, since the film was still in the camera on the October 3, 1963, and it was picked-up probably on the October 4, 1963, processed and passed to the Station on the next work day which would have been Monday, October 7, 1963.

3. Later, the film was taken out of the camera every day, but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed, which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone, but that wasn't the way Winston Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage. Sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the numbers game of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables, or reports, produced. [NARA 1993.07.0616:17:21:930150]
1. LEE OSWALD WHO CALLED SOVIEMB 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL

LEE HENRY OSWALD (201-289248) BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS,
LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES
WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN
INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR,
BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED
STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW,
INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB
THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD
POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED
HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA
IF "WE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING
OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT
HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER
APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT
THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION
OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS
APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET
CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE
13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK
WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS
MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA A
DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HQS TRACKS.
HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE
COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT
WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS
OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING
EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HQS INFO WAS [ODACID] REPORT DATED MAY 1962
SAYING [ODACID] HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND
BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE
HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD
TO USA.

(CONTINUED)
4. STATION SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE TO [SPY1, ODENY], [ODOATH], AND [ODURGE] Locally. INFO PARA TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH [ODACID].

5. REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED TO HQS OF [ODENY], [ODACID], [ODOATH], AND [ODURGE]. PLS KEEP HQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

WH CMT: *According to [KIENVOY] 1 Oct, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name was Oswald (phonetic) stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local dissemination had been made.

SR/CIA [in draft]
CI/Liaison/Elem (in draft)
CI/SPG/Target (in draft)
C/W/3  [in draft]

T. Maramessine
ADDP RELAYING OFFICER

281-289248

W. Lavell
J.C. King
CGD
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
On OCTOBER 10, 1963, CIA Headquarters sent the Mexico City CIA Station a cable that read:

Origin: CHARLOTTE VIDELA BUSTOS:jpm [Elsie Scaleti]
Unit: Western Hemisphere/3/Mexico.
Ext: 5940. To Mexico City
From Director
Conf Western Hemisphere 8,
Info ADDP [Assistant Director/Directorate Plans]
CI, [Counter-Intelligence]
CI/OPS, [Counter-Intelligence Operations]
CI/SP [Counter-Intelligence/Special Projects AKA Special Activities Group]
FI, SR [Foreign Intelligence, Soviet Research] 7, RF, VR. [one of these acronyms has got to be CUBA]
To Mexi
Ref: Mexi 6453 (IN 36017)*

1. LEE OSWALD who called SOVEMB on October 1, 1963, probably identical LEE HENRY OSWALD (201-289,248) born October 18, 1939, New Orleans, former radar operator in the United States Marines who defected to USSR in October 1959."

As you can see the cable contained an accurate description of OSWALD based on FBI documents in his 201 file, "OSWALD is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty-five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue eyes" background on OSWALD'S defection and re-defection, including his statement that he wished to return to the United States if "we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me." This was the only piece of derogatory in the cable.

3. Latest Headquarters information was ODACID [State Department] report dated May 1962, saying ODACID had determined OSWALD is still US citizen, and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits, and the Department of State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass information reference and paragraph one to TPELIDE, ODENVY [FBI], ODOATH, [NAVY] and ODURGE [Immigration and Naturalization Service] locally. Information paragraphs two and three originates with ODACID.

5. Reference and possible identification being disseminated to Headquarters of ODENVY, ODACID, ODOATH, and ODURGE. Please keep Headquarters advised on any further contacts or positive identification of OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE
Western Hemisphere Comment: According to LIENVOY October 1, 1963, an American male who spoke broken Russian said his name LEE OSWALD (phonetic) stated he was at the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

T. Karamessines ADDP [Assistant Deputy Director Plans]
SR/CI/A/Roll (in draft) - [Stephan Roll, Angleton’s Soviet Russia Counter-intelligence liaison]
William Hood, Releasing Officer CI/Liaison/Jane Roman (in draft)
J. C. KING CWHD [Chief Western Hemisphere Division] Authenticating Officer
CI/SPG/Ann Egerter (in draft) [Counter-intelligence Special Projects Group]
C/WH/3 (Scelso) [John Moss Whitten Chief Western Hemisphere 3]
WH/COPS [Western Hemisphere Covert Operations]

[Another version contained the name "J. White." Possibly Allen White]

William Hood was questioned about this document in November 1993:

Is that the real OSWALD? The 'Henry' puts me off. Is the birth date correct? Do you know how many documents I looked at each day? I almost certainly didn't originate it. I would have released it.

The document contained this stamp: "See Sanitized File A, Number 3, For Sterile copy of this document." No date was affixed to the stamp, which meant it originated when the document did. Thomas B. Ross and David Wise reported that when John McCone became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1962 he instructed "the Plans Division to keep the Intelligence Division [Counter-Intelligence] posted on all its activities. Thereafter, the Intelligence Division received 'Sanitized' reports (names of agents removed) on all current operations." [Ross & Wise Inv. Gov. p239] John Caldwell King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division was the Authenticating Officer.

Colonel J.C. King was stationed in Argentina from 1941 to 1945 and in Guatemala from 1952 to 1953 where he worked closely with HOWARD HUNT and DAVID PHILLIPS on OPERATION PBSUCCESS, the overthrow of the Arbenz Government. In December 1956, J.C. King met with HUNT in Cuba. During this meeting, J.C. King stated that Fidel Castro had been heavily involved in Bogotazo riots. On December 11, 1959, Colonel J. C. King wrote a memorandum to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, which observed that the far left dictatorship which existed in Cuba would, if permitted to stand, encourage undesirable actions against United States holdings in other Latin American countries. One of J. C. King's four recommended actions was that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro...Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government." Richard Bissell told the SSCIA that he discussed with J. C. King
using syndicate members in a Fidel Castro assassination attempt. [SSCIA, Alleged Ass. Plots Inv. For. Lead. 11.20.75 p93]

Five days after the explosion aboard La Coubre, a Western Hemisphere-4 meeting, headed by CIA Colonel J. C. King, took place to execute the Operation Pluto plan of covert actions against Cuba signed by President Eisenhower. Colonel King was in contact with Rolando Masferrer Rojas, one of the counterrevolutionary leaders in Miami and an old henchman of the Batista dictatorship. Through a U.S. mine engineer, Masferrer informed King in advance of the arrival of arms shipments to Cuba and the ports at which they were to dock. J. C. King was Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs. HUNT reported that J. C. King was the "general factotum" of the Green Committee, a Bay of Pigs fact-finding body comprising United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles and retired General Maxwell Taylor. HUNT wrote that its "unannounced aim became clear: to whitewash the New Frontier by heaping guilt on CIA." [HUNT Day p213] STURGIS knew Colonel J. C. King and reported "he was the top man for the Bay of Pigs Brigade in Central America." [http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2006/marzo/mierc15/12lacoubre.html]

HEMMING told this researcher:

If OSWALD was used for a task in the Soviet Union and Hood knew about it, along with a group of other people within his own office, would he call attention to himself by looking into OSWALD? Fuck, no. If you are a cohort, and you're involved in dirty business, are you going to build a file that's traceable to you? He's a defector. He goes to a communist embassy in a foreign country. Of course they're going to be interested in him. How many turkeys like this you think were floating around? ANGLETON had a heavy fucking responsibility in this.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 A RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE IN MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A "PASSED" HAIRLINE.

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR...
1. On October 1, 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as LEE OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City...
This document contained the description of the wrong man seen entering the Soviet Embassy, along with the information that OSWALD was a defector but did not mention that he had contact with KGB Agent Valeriy Kostikov. The document was signed

Jane Roman CI/SIG/ Ann Egerter (in draft) [Counter-Intelligence Special Investigation Group - ANGETON] L. N. GALLARY

CI/Liaison SR/CI/Roll (in draft) [Stephan Roll, Angleton’s CI liaison to the SR (Soviet Russia) division] C/WH/R [Chief/Western Hemisphere/Russia]

Releasing Officer. Coordinating Officer Authenticating Officer

What government agency was xxxxx’d out in this document? Could it have been the Secret Service? When the Department of State received its copy, it sent copies to its Department of Security and Consular Affairs, Passport Office, Soviet Department, American Republics Research and Analysis Office, the First Consul and Ambassador at the American Embassy, Mexico City, and to Intelligence and Research. [DOS ltr. Abrams/Cheyes 1.17.64 rel. 5.25.76] When the FBI, Mexico City, received its copy on October 18, 1963, it increased its interest in OSWALD. The Dallas FBI was notified about OSWALD’s visit, and was ordered to notify William C. Sullivan, of the Counter-Espionage Section of the FBI, if OSWALD’s name came up in any context. FBI Mexico City Legal Attaché Clark Anderson arranged with the CIA to follow up on this cable and to verify OSWALD’s entry into Mexico. The FBI was more interested in OSWALD than the CIA was. The CIA explained:

Our Mexico City Station very often produces information on U.S. citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have been able to apprehend and return to the U.S.A. American military personnel attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters desk requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the derogatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government agencies. Derogatory information on Americans is not treated routinely; in each case the DDP or his Assistant personally scrutinize the information, make sure it is credible, and decide whether and to whom it will be passed. Only in absolute emergencies is the Mexico City Station authorized to pass such information directly to the FBI office in the U.S. Embassy...To avoid crossing lines with the FBI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWALD left Mexico on October 3, 1963, and was no longer there when our report was put out. (Deleted as of 2010). November 22, 1963. When word of the shooting reached our operating divisions and staffs on the afternoon of Friday November 22, 1963, transistor radios were turned on everywhere to follow the tragedy. When the name of LEE OSWALD was heard, the effect was electric. A phone message from the FBI came at about the same time, naming OSWALD as the possible assassin and
asking for traces. The message was passed on at once by the Chief CI, Mr. ANGLETON, to Mr. Birch O'Neal of his Special Investigations Unit. Ann Egerter of this unit immediately recognized the name of LEE OSWALD and went for his file. At the same time, Mrs. Bustos [Barbara Manell] of the Mexico Desk, who had written our first report on OSWALD on October 19, 1963, recognized the name from radio reports and went after the same file. Mr. Reichhardt Mexico Desk Chief, who was home on leave, heard the news and phoned in a reminder that we had something on OSWALD.

The Secret Service was not sent a copy of this report, although OSWALD had been in contact with KGB Agent Valeriy Kostikov, a KGB assassin. In fact the name Kostikov or the initials KGB were nowhere to be seen. Did ANGLETON make sure this information was not given to the United States Secret Service so that OSWALD could play his part in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy undisturbed by that Agency? Although not listed as recipient on the cable, the CIA claimed the United States Secret Service received the information electronically, and it was "printed out in their communications section." The Warren Report stated: "No information concerning LEE HARVEY OSWALD appeared in Protective Research Service files prior to the President's trip to Dallas." [ltr. 8.18.77 Gene Wilson/CIA/A J WEBERMAN with enc. R162612Z 10.11.63; WR p433]
On October 15, 1963, CIA Station/Mexico City sent a telex to the DD/Plans: "Action Western Hemisphere 8 INFO: ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SP, FI, SR 7, RF, VR. Please Pouch Photo of OSWALD. Secret Chief of Station. Comment by Winston Scott: Attempts Of LEE OSWALD And Wife To Reenter U.S." [CIA 8-4] What? No mention of KGB contact? The cable should have read "LEE HARVEY OSWALD CIA Station/Mexico City received no response. [D:200-5-41 Mexi 6534 October 15, 1963] It was too late for the CIA. OSWALD was long gone by the time Winston Scott requested his photo."
On October 24, 1963, the CIA cabled the Navy and requested a photograph of OSWALD:

Origin: T. Ward:dd in Unit WH/3 Mexico
Unit: Western Hemisphere/3/Mexico
Ext: 5940; Date: October 23, 1963
To: Department Of Navy
From: CIA
No Index X
File in CS file 201-289248

CONF: Western Hemisphere 8;
INFO: CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, RF, VR
Reference is made to CIA out teletype number 74673, dated October 10, 1963 regarding possible presence of Subject in Mexico City. It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photograph you have of Subject. We will forward them to our representative in Mexico who will attempt to determine if the LEE OSWALD in Mexico City and subject are the same individual.

END OF MESSAGE

CI/OPS/Western Hemisphere (typed in HUGHES) (in draft)

SR/CI/A (draft) (Stephan Roll, Angleton's CI liaison to the Soviet Russia division);

Acting Chief /Western Hemisphere /3/ Mexico (Bernard E. Reichardt)

Jane Roman CI/Liaison

L. N. Gallary Chief / Western Hemisphere / Research Authenticating Officer.

Document # 104-10015-10049 is a one page CIA report dated October 24, 1963. It is from the CIA to the Department of the Navy. The subject is Lee Henry Oswald.

On October 25, 1963, this highly deleted dispatch was sent:
The CIA had OSWALD'S photograph in CIA file #593-252C, an article from the *Washington Post* dated November 16, 1959. When the CIA first released this article, the Xerox was done so that OSWALD'S picture was not visible. In November 1992 he became visible. William Stuckey obtained this article. [CIA 8-4] The CIA could have obtained a glossy photograph from *The Washington Post*. Because the CIA did not
locate this article, OSWALD'S photograph was never sent to the Embassy, and it could not be compared to the surveillance photographs. The investigation of OSWALD by the Mexico City Station of the CIA was stalled. Had it received a photograph, it would have been obvious that of the men photographed entering the Embassy, none of them was OSWALD, and the investigation could have progressed. Did Jane Roman go to ANGLETON for this photograph?
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Ambassador
FROM: Winston H. Scott
SUBJECT: Lee Oswald/Contact with the Soviet Embassy

1. The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source: On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee Oswald. This office determined that OSMALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 20 September 1963 and had talked with Valery Vladimirovich DESTNIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSMALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSMALD, born on 16 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U.S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received.

Orig. - The Ambassador
The Minister
Counselor for Political Affairs
Regional Security Officer - PLEASE RETURN TO THE 9th FLOOR.
cc - Legal Attaché
cc - Naval Attaché
cc - I & E S
cc - Lee Henry OSMALD P
cc - SO [illegible]
cc - Liaison with Legal Attaché
cc - Liaison with Naval Attaché
A Memorandum for the Ambassador drafted by Winston Scott on October 16, 1963, titled "LEE OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy" began:

The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source. On October 1, 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as LEE HARVEY OSWALD. This Officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, and had talked with Valeriy Kostikov, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

Copies of this memorandum were also sent to "The Minister; Counselor for Political Affairs; Regional Security Officer; Legal Attache; Naval Attaché; Liaison with Legal Attaché; Liaison with Naval Attaché; Immigration and Naturalization Service, LEE HENRY OSWALD P-" (P- was an OSWALD Embassy file - P8593). Copies were sent to "a CIA file number."

On Friday, September 27, 1963, and on Saturday, September 28, 1963, OSWALD talked over a tapped telephone line. Sylvia Duran made several references to OSWALD over another tapped line. She furnished descriptive data on him. The CIA claimed that it could not associate the OSWALD who spoke to Ivan Obyedkov on October 1, 1963, with the North American who had been picked up on telephone taps of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Military Attaché, asking for a visa. The CIA also claimed it did not associate OSWALD with the North American Sylvia Duran referred to when she spoke with the Soviets. In 1977 Sylvia Duran was asked if she said "LEE HARVEY OSWALD," rather than "North American," when she spoke to the Soviets. She said she supposed that she used the name "OSWALD." The transcripts revealed that she did not. The HSCA:

The Agency maintained that prior to the assassination, its field sources [the Tarasoffs] had not actually linked OSWALD to the person who visited the Cuban Consulate in October 1963. Testimony obtained directly from these sources, however, established that this connection had in fact been made in early October 1963, [CIA Station, Mexico City] however, was not informed about OSWALD'S visa request, nor of his visits to the Cuban Consulate.

PHILLIPS

In PHILLIPS' autobiography, Nightwatch he wrote that the CIA was aware of OSWALD'S request for a Soviet visa:

The circumstances were such, LEE HARVEY OSWALD wished to return to the Soviet Union via Cuba, that a cable to Headquarters asking for a Washington file check was in order." In his deposition during HUNT v.
WEBERMAN, PHILLIPS stated, "We became aware in the CIA office about his visit to the Cuban Embassy some -- almost immediately after the assassination occurred. It was because information concerning that visit was in the system, and was retrieved almost immediately.

PHILLIP'S had two different stories about when the CIA first became aware OSWALD want a Soviet visa. PHILLIP'S made certain that the investigation of OSWALD by the CIA in Mexico City was deliberately slowed down by having GOODPASTURE slow down and minimize the information about the call wherein the name OSWALD was mentioned then he blamed it on "Craig's wife." The translators told the HSCA that they knew that the man who was discussed over the Cuban and Soviet telephone line was the same man who called the Soviet Embassy in regard to an unspecified request, using the name OSWALD. The translators put two and two together, but that was as far as it went. Their information was suppressed and some of their transcripts were destroyed.

NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF OSWALD AT THE CUBAN CONSULATE

The CIA had an elaborate system of surveillance focused on the Cuban Consulate. Why didn't OSWALD turn up on CIA photographic surveillance of the Cuban Consulate, which was located in the same building as the Cuban Embassy? OSWALD had gone there three times.

NO PHOTOS: FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1963

OSWALD visited the Cuban Consulate on Friday, September 27, 1963. OSWALD came to Mexico City on the last day the CIA's cameras were down. Former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner told the HSCA:

There was no pulse camera opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963. Your investigators have seen the documentation recording this fact. In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of LEE HARVEY OSWALD to Mexico City. The documentation for this statement has been made available to investigators. The Cuban Consulate entrance had been closed for some time [as the result of a CIA stench device operation in 1961] and after it was reopened, Friday, September 27, 1963, was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty was encountered in its installation, and technicians had to machine a part for the equipment. Your investigators have seen the documentation on which these statements are based. The technicians probably had to return to their shop to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance; that photography has been reviewed by your investigators. They also have seen documentation stating the photographic coverage of the Consulate did not commence until sometime in October. Various
difficulties were experienced with the equipment, which seems to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963.

A CIA report indicated that the coverage was not perfected until mid-November 1963.

During the first two weeks of operation, the VLS-2 would trigger traffic entering and leaving the target entrance. Concerned with the necessity of reloading the camera twice daily, LIFEUD/22 devised a system whereby the VLS-2 would only photograph people leaving, but not entering the target building. LIFEUD/22's system works about 80% of the time, cutting film consumption considerably...The Robot Star camera which was given to LIFEUD/22 with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of photographing. PARMUTH replaced this with another Robot. Five days later, the second camera failed to advance properly. In both cases the spring would not advance the film for more than 15 exposures at a full winding...It is requested that a substitute camera be shipped to the Station as soon as possible to replace the Robot Star camera on this project...Willard C. Curtis. [Winston Scott CIA FOIA 02815 11.7.63]

Another of these visits was on a Saturday, September 28, 1963, when the CIA had no coverage. A CIA document stated: "Note only visit we know he made was Cuban Embassy Saturday, September 28, 1963, on which Embassy was closed and we have not had coverage. In future will require at least half day photographic coverage both Soviet and Cuban Embassies. [CIA 59-23]

The CIA's cameras that were focused on the Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate were positioned in a vacant apartment across the street. The CIA: "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment, using an impulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties. [This device was not installed until December 1963.] (Deleted as of 2010) (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station."

A CIA document dated February 10, 1977 stated:

SOURCE: Notes made by Ann Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff
SUBJECT: Background on Mexico Station Support Assets
(Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)
1. (Deleted) Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened (deleted) arrival of Mr. Winston Scott, Chief of Station (deleted) (still in LA/HQ) had had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (LIPSTICK) consisted of multi-line phone taps, three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team, and a mail intercept operation. Telephone taps (LIFEAT) were placed by (Deleted) handled by a Station case officer. The number of lines tapped
was limited only by the availability of a listening post nearby and the availability of language (English, Spanish, Soviet, Polish, Czech etc.) Generally these were Mexican or Mexican-Americans recruited agents who were related (which the Station at that time felt was good security in that if they talked shop, they would talk to each other.)

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer, assisted by TSD technicians on TDY from Headquarters, who advised the stations on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. The operations had sub-crypts under project LIPSTICK namely LIMITED, LILYRIC and LICALLA). LIMITED was a fixed site bang opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and pedestrian entrance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the Soviet compound and the LIMITED site was diagonally across double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). LIMITED was the first photo base, and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. I think the Station bought this property (a one story Spanish Colonial stone house) through LIMOUSINE (check to be sure). Later, this house began to fall apart. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. The photo operators were moved to another apartment nearby. The property was sold (under an operational agreement with LIMOUSINE for a long term lease on the top floor of a new apartment building to be built on this site). LILYRIC was planned as an alternative photographic base. It was located in an upper apartment building on the same side of the street as the LIMITED site but in the middle of the block south. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. The agents in LIMITED and LILYRIC and LICALLA as far as we knew, were not acquainted with each other. LILYRIC was a rented apartment. LICALLA the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. The site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel (who at the time were largely unidentified in Mexico Station records). The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother, and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the LIMITED and LILYRIC sites three times a week. The film was then developed and printed into 9 X 10 contact sheets contact print strips by his sister's husband. The master plan was for LICALLA film to be processed inside Station, but TSD man from 1957 to 1959 resigned, could not handle the volume, and as the unprocessed film began to accumulate, the inside CO Mahoney became disgusted and took the film out for (Deleted's) brother-in-law to process probably early 1959. This (Deleted) became the handler for all three photo bases. A sensitive Staff D monitoring operation
was run out of another of these houses (crypt for the four house was LIMOST-1 etc). This was handled by Glenn Widden (outside TSD officer) and Mahoney using HQ TDY teams for monitoring. This operation was also separate from LICALLA. The two houses in between were rented to unsuspecting tenants.

Mobile surveillance was developed by Anderson and later placed under Mahoney and Joseph Sancho. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the LIMITED site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. They would stay with them until they made their meetings. These agents were aware of the LIMITED site since they had been issued LIMITED photographs for identification purposes. This worked fairly well until about the middle of 1958, when one of the surveillance agents got too close to his target and was arrested by Mexican transit police and turned over to the Mexican Secret Service. By the time the Station could arrange a cleared attorney and bail him out the agent had identified Sancho, (who was evacuated across the border at Nogales by Bob Shaw) and the inside phone number of Maloney (who was subsequently replaced by Louis Puckett. As a result of this flap, the LIFFAT project was broken up into several others. The agents were not changed, but given new crypts. (Deleted) and (Deleted) replaced Anderson in handling the (deleted phone) taps. Puckett replaced Mahoney and handled the surveillance team LIENTRAP and the photo bases through (Pages Deleted).

The Station also conducted a mail operation, LIBRIGHT which was handled by an American case officer, Charlie Anderson III. (Deleted) obtained selected letters from a subagent.

2. (Deleted) Coverage:

(Deleted) was unreliable and insecure as characterized by the nature of the Mexican Services at that time. The Mexican Direction of Federal Security (DFS) (Deleted) was a hip-pocket group run out of the Mexican Ministry of Government. This Ministry was principally occupied with political investigations and control of foreigners. Their agents were brutal and corrupt. (Deleted)

3. OSWALD Coverage

The base house listening post had a live monitor who made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume to the Chief of Station which was received each day around 8:00 a.m. passed by (Deleted) to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9:00 a.m. Later, when a reel was completely recorded full transcripts were typed and
passed to the Station, however, there was usually a lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. Boris did the Russian translation but because of the volume or Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to Boris by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by (Deleted) but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to (Deleted) to take to Boris. (Deleted) handled all the processing of Soviet transcripts. Goodpasture’s job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself OSWALD was probably an American. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked-up three times a week, but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before, since the technician who was processing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later, this was changed, and the operator cleared the camera each day. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. 2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. weekdays) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur, but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties. (Deleted as of 2010) (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. Lorna MacKay screened the film inside the station.

OSWALD came to the attention of the listening post operators from a tap on the Soviet line. It was picked-up and taken to Tarasoff for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay, because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English, since the Chief of Station could only read these two languages, and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

My memory is a little vague about the origins of the Cuban Embassy, but I think the staff first developed from a pro-Castro group celebrating on New Years eve 1959. As I recall, it was a makeshift arrangement of volunteers through most of 1960 and 1961 with Tom Hazlitt producing voluminous reports on their activities and recruiting agents right and left among Cuban Nationals in Mexico City.

Personnel assignments: Of interest to us now is who was in Mexico during the period prior to OSWALD’S visit, and the subsequent investigation by the Warren Commission. To determine who was there, and what they were doing, I have grouped persons together chronologically with areas of their assignment (Deleted) so that as the name pops up, one can tell what
period they were in Mexico and what their assignments were at the time. (Deleted) COS Winston Scott (deceased) DCOS (Deleted) Covert Action (Deleted) Cuban Operations (Deleted) Soviet Target (Deleted) Soviet Transcribers (Deleted) Support Assets (Deleted) [This was a combination of two highly deleted documents]. ^

The Cubans knew of this operation in 1963, but were powerless to do anything about it, since the project had Mexican Police approval. [CIA Cuba Accuses Havana 1978]

PHILLIPS stated: "I know there are a lot of stories about photographs of OSWALD taken in Mexico City. None were taken. The cameras were not working that day." In a deposition PHILLIPS repeated: "There were no photographs taken by the CIA of OSWALD, as far as I know, or by anybody else during his visit to Mexico."

OSWALD was told to go to Mexico City Cuban Consulate at a time when the old surveillance system was being replaced by a new surveillance system. He was told this by DAVID PHILLIPS who, as the man in charge of Cuban Operations, was in charge of putting it in place.

NO PHOTOGRAPHS OF OSWALD AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY

OSWALD visited the Soviet Embassy at least twice.

The CIA:

Of the photographic coverage of the entrance to the Soviet Embassy, the Agency has been able to locate the photography of only one of the two cameras involved. It is believed this is all that exists. The last picture taken by that one camera on Friday, September 27, 1963, was at 11:46 a.m. OSWALD did not appear in the day's photography, so it is safe to say he did not go there prior to that time. OSWALD returned to the Soviet Embassy on Saturday, another day that there was no coverage.

DAVID PHILLIPS said he had studied the photographs: "John and I spent several days studying literally hundreds of photographs available to the CIA before, and during, OSWALD'S trip to Mexico City." Asked about accusations that the pictures had been destroyed PHILLIPS answered, "Absolutely untrue. I was there and I know." On September 30, 1980, PHILLIPS was deposed in HUNT v. WEBERMAN:

Q. OSWALD had a conversation on October 1, 1963 with Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov.

A. Counselor, since I retired from the CIA five years ago, I have been a professional writer. I have had three books published by major firms. Based on that experience I have the eerie sensation that these questions are aimed at producing some sort of manuscript, rather than court records.
What possible reason is there in this case to ask me, a CIA agent who's already made it obvious that I am not going to violate my secrecy oath, to describe what happened at the Soviet Embassy?

Q. My concern is to establish truth as a defense to the libel action and the slander action.

A. Well, perhaps we can save a little time. I do want to make a general statement because, apparently, of what you are leading to. One, I am absolutely convinced that LEE HARVEY OSWALD had no connection with the CIA. If HOWARD HUNT ever met LEE HARVEY OSWALD, I certainly never knew about it. Judging from what I know about being in Mexico City at the time, during the time period we are talking about, both the Soviets and the Cubans thought that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was some sort of kook and sent him back to Dallas alone. And during that period -- right now, there's been so much about perhaps the CIA was behind the assassination. I would like to say to you, ah-ha. I would love to prove Castro was behind it or the Soviets. I can't. LEE HARVEY OSWALD to my knowledge had no connection with the CIA, no connection with HOWARD HUNT.

And finally, addressing another thing, a moment ago Mr. Weberman mentioned a statement by Mr. Tad Szulc. Tad Szulc is a widely known journalist. He made a statement, I believe it was in the book about HOWARD HUNT, in which he said that HOWARD HUNT was Acting Chief of Station in Mexico City in the 1963 area. I am convinced that Mr. Szulc making that statement was in error.

Q. All right. Do you know whether or not Mr. OSWALD ever offered any information to the Soviets in exchange for a visa and whether or not he identified himself during the various calls by name or just said "It's me" expecting them to know who he was?

A. I'm aware of various things that had been printed in the newspapers, including the story printed about me which incorrectly said that I destroyed various matters and so forth. I'm aware of those stories. But I'm afraid we are right back to the business that I will get in the same kind of trouble that I have gotten into in the past if I try to go into facts any further.

There were no pictures of OSWALD, because PHILLIPS and HUNT had instructed him to enter the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate at a time there was no photographic coverage. Evidence of this was presented in Nodule 16.
PHILLIPS: "None of the CIA Mexico City personnel knew anything about LEE HARVEY OSWALD." There was, however, someone at the Embassy who did. D. E. Boster was stationed at the American Embassy, Mexico City, in October 1963. Boster became a political officer there in September 1962. In June 1993 D. E. Boster stated,

PHILLIPS was in the Embassy in Mexico City when I was there. We knew each other, but we didn't know each other well. I was in the Foreign Service, not the CIA. I don't know who PHILLIPS consulted about OSWALD. I mean, I was never consulted. I was never aware of any...

PHILLIPS refused to answer any questions regarding D. E. Boster.

CLARK ANDERSON

FBI Legal Attaché Clark Anderson worked in the American Embassy, Mexico City, at the time HUNT worked there. Clark Anderson told this researcher he was assigned to Mexico City from 1948 through 1958 and

...during that period of time I have no recollection of HUNT. It wouldn't be unusual. They had their operation, we had ours. I did know DAVID PHILLIPS.

PHILLIPS described Clark Anderson as "the senior FBI station man in Mexico...the CIA and FBI in Mexico worked together over many years." Clark Anderson conducted the investigation of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City for the Warren Commission. He wanted J. Edgar Hoover to send him three agents who would help him bring the Kennedy investigation matter to its "logical end" - two veterans of the Mexico City Field Office, and Dallas FBI S.A. Wallace Heitman. Clark Anderson believed "there was more to this matter than simply a 'nut' shooting the President." [FBI DL 89-43-103] J. Edgar Hoover never sent these particular agents, although Wallace Heitman did conduct 12 interviews concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. PHILLIPS, and an associate he called "John," helped Clark Anderson conduct his investigation of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City. During HUNT v. WEBERMAN PHILLIPS was asked:

Q. Clark Anderson was the FBI investigator down in the Mexico City area after November 1963. Were you aware of his investigation in Mexico City?

A. I was aware that Mr. Clark Anderson was chief of the FBI. He was not an investigator. He was the senior FBI station in Mexico.

Q. Did he ever request any assistance of you on working on the investigation in that area at that time?
A. The CIA and FBI in Mexico worked together over many, many years.

The FBI consulted with PHILLIPS who described the CIA's surveillance operation as a "plant." [Legat Mexico City 105-3702 3.6.64 - NARA FBI 124-10162-10023]

THE DEATH OF WINSTON SCOTT

During a telephone conversation in 1993 with this researcher Ambassador Thomas Mann stated:

I never saw the CIA's incoming and outgoing messages, and I don't even know what - who killed Winston Scott or why? He died in his own backyard. It was a very mysterious death.

Thomas C. Mann had been Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs during the early stages of Bay of Pigs. He pondered the legality of the invasion, finally concluding it was justified because Cuba was a Soviet satellite. Dick Russell reported:

It was on a late weekend night, and, the way family members recall it, Scott had gone outside alone and climbed up the gangplank to get a better look at a new brick wall that was being built in his backyard. His tumble into the rose bushes seemed more embarrassing to him than anything else. He went to bed, awoke in some pain with bruises and cuts, then experienced trouble breathing at breakfast. He was taken to the hospital where a doctor found nothing seriously wrong and sent him home. On April 26, 1971, as he was preparing to go to his office, his wife, Janet, found Scott slumped over a chair at his breakfast table. No autopsy was performed, and a postmortem suggested he had apparently suffered a blood clot to his heart during the fall."


ANGLETON

ANGLETON flew to Mexico City to attend the funeral of Winston Scott. According to the family of Winston Scott, ANGLETON was interested obtaining all of Winston Scott's papers. Scott Breckinridge wrote:
MEMO FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Win Scott MSS

1. Ben Evans spoke with Colonel White (White phoned him) yesterday. After finishing their discussion Ben asked White what he recalled about Scott's diary/mss.

2. White says that Readers Digest had a copy, which led to our interest. Mr. ANGLETON went to Mexico City and got the manuscript. It was a lousy thing, filled with Scott's sex life and operations, and someone 'deep-sixed' it. I didn't get out of this whether that meant it was destroyed, although it seems this is what happened. Ben spoke with George Lauder (DC/LA) who confirmed this outline. Ben felt that someone had been doing work on it, and he told Lauder of my interest. SDB

WINSTON SCOTT'S MANUSCRIPT

Raymond M. Reardon located the manuscript in the possession of the CI Staff: "Since the CI Staff is the office of record in regard to the Kennedy assassination material, they are in the best position to comment on the factual errors in Mr. Scott's account of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City." Reardon was afraid that Readers Digest had obtained a copy of the manuscript through Scott's friend, John Barron, and was going to publish it. [NARA 1993.07.21.17:02:09:060280]

Winston Scott's manuscript differed from the CIA's version of events. Winston Scott wrote:

I learned something of LEE HARVEY OSWALD in the period from Friday, September 27, 1963, when LEE HARVEY OSWALD, having just arrived in Mexico City, made his first contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He said that he wanted to go to the Crimea. In fact, LEE HARVEY OSWALD became a person of great interest to us during his September 27, 1963, to October 1, 1963, period. He contacted the Soviet Embassy on at least four occasions and one once went directly from the office of Sylvia Duran.

Because we thought at first that LEE HARVEY OSWALD might be a dangerous potential defector from the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union, he was of great interest to us, so we kept a special watch on him and his activities. He was observed on all his visits to each of the two communist embassies, and his conversations with personnel of these embassies were studied in detail, so far as we knew them. OSWALD told a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Embassy that that officer should have had word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his visit and its purpose, after he had spelled out his full name, slowly and carefully, for this Soviet. He gave them his name very slowly and carefully and saying
the Soviet Embassy in Mexico should have received word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that he (OSWALD) would contact them about a visa for himself, his wife, who he said was a Soviet citizen and their child....He further told this Soviet that he should know that OSWALD, his wife and child wanted to go to the Crimea urgently and he (OSWALD) had learned that he would have to go by way of Cuba. OSWALD was then directed to the Cuban Embassy by the Soviet, who told OSWALD he would need a Cuban transit visa. These visits are no hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed OSWALD as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington indicating obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help OSWALD...OSWALD’S visits at both the Communist Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City are, together with what is known of what took place during these visits, sufficient to make him a suspect agent, acting on behalf of the Soviets, in several things, including the assassination of Kennedy. When one studies the conversations OSWALD is known to have had with officials of both these communist embassies, it is evident that there are sufficient data for this suspicion...

[Leader IG Staff to Reardon OS 12.21.70; NARA 1993.07.21.19:54:08:930590]

ANGLETON knew that OSWALD had been instructed by PHILLIPS and HUNT in regard to CIA surveillance, and how to avoid it, and that OSWALD did not show up on the CIA’s cameras. ANGLETON knew that Scott was lying. Dick Russell believed Winston Scott possessed tapes of the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy telephone taps during the period OSWALD telephoned. The CIA CI Staff commented: "OSWALD identified himself only as LEE OSWALD and did not spell out his name. NB: The only explanation is that the transcript is not literal but only a summary." Scott said that OSWALD wanted to go to the Crimea. This referred to the Odessa phone call that the CIA said was not linked to OSWALD. SCOTT was about to inadvertently double-cross ANGLETON when he suddenly died.

**WINSTON SCOTT’S MISSING MANUSCRIPT**

Winston Scott died in April 1971. His widow discussed his death with the CIA Station in Mexico City:

(2 - Deleted) turned to planned Scott trip to see Director of which she aware and covered chief parts of manuscript of which she aware but which she said she had not seen. She told ANGLETON on April 29, 1971, that she and others have heard much talk of manuscript from Scott. For example, Burnell Goodrich claims to have read one chapter. She thinks (Deleted) may have helped with (5 - Deleted) parts. This discussion of manuscript by Scott, although not clear who all may have read it, means it
is well known and, according to her, looked for with some anticipation by friends in his U.S. circle here. (2 - Deleted) advised her against reading manuscript, as it discusses in open way intimate matters of previous marriage. Importantly (2 - Deleted) pointed out, information therein would violate two different secrecy agreements (Deleted and U.S.) as well as doing great damage to our relationships with other governments. The information is, as it were, U.S. Government property and (2 - Deleted) said that the publication would dismay Scotts' friends and harm his reputation and memory. She seemed appalled at the idea of publishing manuscript, saying that she realized when Scott told her of visit to Director that something was wrong. She also asked (2 - Deleted) about Scott's motivation in this. In discussion of these and other papers she agreed (although it then seemed to ANGLETON somewhat hesitant) to cooperate with ANGLETON on getting Agency papers from Curtis' belongings. (2 - Deleted) will remember Barron statement late night of April 28, 1971, that he would forget the manuscript, taking no steps to go forward with publication...With her efficient cooperation ANGLETON spent several hours going through safes and cabinets and valises in study, and loaded three large cartons and four valises with file folders and notes and memoranda of classified Station files. Also, when she and brothers at Curtis office the previous day, they had pulled out, under lawyer's eyes, number of documents which obviously classified or Agency oriented (Curtis name in pseudonym, Secret stamps and so on.)...While we shall inventory later, to at least cursory extent, importantly we got two original drafts (apparently the second and rewrite) and two carbons of manuscript. Plus there were a number of drafts, some repetitive of what appears to have been the final manuscript. She knows of no other copies extant, save what Barron may have. She says manuscript typed in final in English by woman in Mexico unknown to her, and we will trace this. Not sure we have all classified papers, and think she and lawyer will cooperate in turning over other finds. There is one locked box in safe which, when she has key, she promised to open with ANGLETON. We suspect this may contain missing tapes on (Deleted) case and 'Lesbians" which Barron spoke of to (2 - Deleted). (We have found Huey Newton and Cleaver tapes but these only tapes so far.)...Manuscript. It appears to ANGLETON that she is not even wistful about it at this point, and when she commented that Scott must have had money in mind it apparent that she did not want money that badly (although clear she quite uncertain about her financial status or future.) ANGLETON warned her that Scott's friends may feel Agency has pulled a fast one with manuscript but that ANGLETON was prepared to weather that one...On April 30, 1971, Mrs. Scott turned over further classified papers to (Deleted) along with a small arsenal of weapons... [CIA 300115Z April 1971 Cit (Deleted) 16466]

THE CIA DOCUMENTS ABOUT THE FIRST ARREST OF SYLVIA DURAN
After November 22, 1963, at the request of United States Ambassador Thomas Mann, the Mexican CIA Station cabled Headquarters:

Paragraph 3. Mexi suggesting to (deleted) that Sylvia Duran...who put OSWALD on telephone from Cuban Embassy to talk to Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, be arrested immediately by Mexican authorities and held incommunicado until she gives all details on OSWALD known to her. [CIA 56-20]

This request was sent to Luis Echevarria who was on the CIA’s pad, though his private secretary (Accacer) on November 23, 1963. Copies were put in OSWALD's file at the Mexican Embassy P - 8593, in Duran's file and in Deleted's file. [CIA 64-552] In another document Mann suggested:

We should immediately request Mexicans to arrest Sylvia Duran so as to eliminate possibility of her being smuggled out of Mexico or killed here. This should be done immediately and irrespective of whether Washington decides to authorize us to act along lines of other foregoing recommendations. [CIA 128-590]

Thomas Mann was contacted in June 1993. He stated: "I don't know anything about that message. The Embassy had over a thousand people, and the CIA and the FBI had their own people. I never heard tapes of OSWALD nor did I see any transcriptions. I'm 80 years old."

When Assistant Deputy Director / Plans, Thomas Karamessines, discovered the arrest of Sylvia Duran was imminent, he contacted Mexico City Stations (KUBARK) and told the Kubarkers to cancel it:

Memo for the Record:

After receipt of MEXI 7029 at about 5:15 p.m. on November 23, 1963, saying that the Mexican Federal Police arrest Sylvia Duran, Mr. Karamessines ADDP, ordered us to phone the Mexican Federal Police and tell them not to do it. We phoned as ordered, against my wishes and also wrote a flash cable which we did not then send. Mr. Scott answered and said it was too late to call off the arrest. He emphasized that the Mexicans had known of the OSWALD involvement with Sylvia Duran through the same information. He agreed with our request that the arrest be kept secret and that no information be leaked. [CIA 36-540]

The unnamed CIA agent Thomas Karamessines spoke with recalled: "I told him it was too late, I could not reverse the request."
Note Written by COS: At 4:20 p.m. on November 23, 1963, [written with Roman numerals] I had a call from Scelso (Washington) asking that I not do paragraph 3. (to arrest Sylvia Duran para 36 above) I told him it was too late, I cannot rescind request. I told him, in what I hope was secure language, that he already should have received a cable in which I told them that (President) here had knowledge which made this action (against Duran) so that it could be Mexican initiative. He said 'O.K.'. (Deleted.)

Note: I had return call from Echevarria (at about 3:15 p.m. on November 23, 1963) saying they wanted to get 'Mujor' and he would immediately notify me. He thanked me for info on her. Signed COS [CIA 56-20]

Another CIA note regarding the arrest of Duran had this note on it in Egerter's handwriting "Echevarria said she was arrested with seven others including her husband. They were having a fiesta and Echevarria had just had a meeting with the President (Who apparently said 'Proceed' and interrogate forcefully)." [CIA 3-526]
Thomas Karamessines released a FLASH cable that read:

ORIGIN: Scelso [John Moss Whitten]
UNIT: C/WESTERN HEMISPHERE 3
EXT: 5613
DATE: NOVEMBER 23, 1963
TO: MEXICO CITY
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: WESTERN HEMISPHERE 8
INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR7, Special Activities
Staff 8, Office of Security 2, VR
To: FLASH MEXI

1. Arrest of Sylvia Duran is extremely serious matter that could prejudice ODYOKE [United States] freedom of action on entire question of
PBRUMEN [Cuban] responsibility. With full regard for Mexican interests, request you insure her arrest is kept absolutely secret, that no information from her is published or leaked, that all such information is cabled to us, and that the fact of her arrest and her statements are not spread to leftist or disloyal Mexican Government circles.

2. We are trying to get more info on OSWALD from ODENVY and will advise directly through ODENVY Mexi.

Thomas H. Karamessines SC/WH 3 [John Moss Whitten]

ADDP RELEASING OFFICER Authenticating Officer [CIA 37-529; NARA JFK 10015-10118]

Note: The definition of ODYOKE as "the United States" and PBRUMEN as "Cuban" came from earlier versions of this document in which these words were substituted for the digraphs which appeared in the 1995 release.

John Scelso [John Moss Whitten] or Thomas Karamessines believed that if the Mexican Police tortured Sylvia Duran, the CIA - rather than Cuba - might have to take the blame for the Kennedy assassination. What could Sylvia Duran have known that would have hurt the right and benefited the left? Maybe OSWALD confided in her when they were having sexual intercourse? Maybe she had spied on OSWALD? When questioned by the SSCIA about this, on this author's suggestion, Thomas Karamessines "could not recall preparing the cable or his reasons for issuing such a message." [CIA 37-529-11.23.63; SSCIA Hearings-V5 p25] President Echevarria promised to keep the arrest secret. [CIA 70-557]

Richard Helms sent this cable to the Mexico City CIA Station:
For you private information, there distinct feeling here in all three agencies (FBI, CIA and State) that Ambassador is pushing this case too hard (see paragraph 5 of MEXI-7104 and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions. Understand from Mr. Johnson that he sent State Channels telegram to Ambassador this afternoon attempting to give him better perspective on this whole problem. We hope this will be some assistance in reducing his pressures on you. [CIA 8546 11.27.63, Class. Message]

Thomas C. Mann wanted the Mexican Police to inform Sylvia Duran, "her only chance for survival is to come clean with the whole story...in return for Mexican Government protection." [CIA 128590] On November 23, 1963, the Mexican Police followed Sylvia Duran until she stopped at the home of her brother-in-law. They then arrested everyone there, including Barbara Ann Bliss, who had lived in pre-Castro Cuba for many years. Barbara Ann Bliss declared that her father, Alonzo Bliss, owned numerous Cuban sugar plantations before the revolution. Now, she lived "on $800 a month from a Washington company that administered the estate of her father" although her rent was $1,200. An Alonzo Bliss who owned valuable Washington, D.C. real estate was mentioned in a 1919 Congressional Report. Barbara admitted to the Mexican Police that "she maintains a correspondence with a Cuban who sends her information which she passes to her father." A Barbara Ann Cera, (nee Bliss); 56 died on November 21, 2002. Charles Bentley was arrested. He told the police that "He is in the process of getting a job as salesman with the Sonora Cattle Company, and that he has worked in Minneapolis as an assistant business manager. From 1954 through 1957 he served in the U.S. Marine Corps." Ruben Duran Navarro, a native of Los Angeles, was arrested. Ruben was married to Betty Serratos; he was 38 years old, and was in the process of obtaining his Mexican citizenship. Betty Serratos De Duran was a Honduran who had been residing in Mexico for ten years. She had the status of "familiar" immigrant, was 33 years old, and had taken a secretarial course in Kentucky.

SYLVIA DURAN'S RE-ARREST

On November 27, 1963, Sylvia Duran was re-arrested because she was expected to leave Mexico for Cuba. The CIA reported: "Second pickup which was made on Government of Mexico initiative, without prior consultation with Station or with PBSWING obviously evidence great desire Mexican authorities to be of service." [CIA 195-627] Richard Helms ordered the Mexico City Station to "insure that neither Sylvia Duran, nor Cubans get the impression that Americans are behind re-arrest. We want Mexican authorities to take responsibility for whole affair." This time, the Mexican Police questioned her about her ability to facilitate travel to Cuba. She claimed she had no such ability, since she "lacked contact with Cuba." [CIA 189-623, 177-618] The CIA prepared a set of questions for Sylvia Duran.
THE TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

Sylvia Duran was told that this researcher believed that she was starting employment with the CIA around the time OSWALD visited her in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. She was questioned about why the CIA reacted as it did to her arrest. Sylvia Duran:

That is something I do not know. The CIA can think whatever they want. This is the first time I hear that. I mean I hear a lot of nonsense, but this is the most...I mean it is completely. I was not arrested. I was holded to answer some questions. They told me it was not an arrest. Afterwards, the Cuban Government protested, I guess you could call it my arrest, and I was questioned again. I stopped working at the Cuban Consulate because my government tell me I need permission. I didn't want to apply, so I stopped work there.

PHILLIPS was asked why the CIA was concerned about the arrests of Sylvia Duran. He refused to answer: "I would like to say that with this last question, you have come to a new part of this thing. Before there were these questions that bothered me so much. Now you are asking me to analyze CIA traffic written by other people." He was asked to comment on these names: "Maria Carmen Olavarri, Maria Teresa Proenza, Barbara Ann Bliss or Horacio Duran?" He responded: "Counselor, I am not going to comment on the list of names and groups."

BIRCH O'NEAL

On November 22, 1963, CI/SIG Staffer Birch D. O'Neal cabled the Mexico City CIA Station to find out what it had on OSWALD: "Important you review all LIENVOY tapes and transcripts since September 27, 1963, to locate all material possibly pertinent to Subject ref. Dispatch soonest by special courier, staffer if necessary, full transcripts and original tapes if available all pertinent material." [CIA 40-541] According to author Paul Hoch: "On the day of the assassination, an FBI agent from the Washington Field Office [S.A. Courtland J. Jones] interviewed Birch O'Neal for the purpose of obtaining 'any information' in the CIA files on OSWALD." [Hoch Con. Dallas & Beyond p478] Birch O'Neal replied the only documents CIA possessed were those originating with the FBI and the State Department.

This was untrue. There was cable traffic from Mexico City. In July 1993 Birch D. O'Neal stated:

I've been contacted by many people who write books. I took an obligation to my government with regard to information that I had years ago. I was a close contact, I worked with JAMES ANGLETON, and I refuse to take any position about what anybody writes about him in this day and age. And I feel that anyone that was engaged in these activities during the war, or any other time, has a obligation to do the same. I can't even talk about it to
my fellow employees. I have an obligation to other people that have real interests. I could die and go to hell before I will talk to anybody about it. I just don’t feel anything is to be gained in our society by talking about these things and there’s nothing in world wrong with JIM ANGLETON. He lived just like you do and I do.

Edward Petty was asked about Birch O'Neal: "He was, in essence, the beginning of CI/SIG. He's the fellow that keeps all the secrets." In January 1964 the FBI requested that Birch O'Neal determine whether any of the listed names, addresses or telephone numbers linked to OSWALD were connected to Soviet intelligence. Birch O'Neal assigned the task to Bruce Solie of the CIA's Office of Security. Bruce Solie was an associate of ANGLETON and William Branigan. [CIA 506-213] Bruce Solie's normal job was to investigate the evidence against suspected moles as speedily as possible.

ANGLETON AND PHILLIPS FILTER CIA INFO GOING TO WARREN COMMISSION

The matter was discussed with Mr. [03] and he subsequently advised that as a result of a conference with Mr. Helms and others in which he was directed to prepare certain materials to be passed to the Warren Commission, he was quite sure it was not the desire of the Agency to make available to the Commission at least in this manner – via the FBI – sensitive information which could relate to phone taps. Mr. Papich again raised the question on December 19, 1964 and after consultation with Mr. ANGLETON and Mr. Papich that when the Bureau of facing problems of this nature in meeting the needs of the Commission, the Bureau should not pass to the Commission information from this Agency, but should refer the Commission to the Agency for additional information. [CI-SIG Memo For Record December 20, 1963]